What is skzi on a computer. Cryptographic information protection

1.1. This Funding Policy cryptographic protection information ( Further - Policy ) determines the procedure for organizing and ensuring the functioning of encryption ( cryptographic) means designed to protect information that does not contain information constituting a state secret ( Further - CIPF, crypto-means ) if they are used to ensure safety confidential information and personal data when they are processed in information systems.

1.2. This Policy has been developed in pursuance of:

• federal law "About personal data" , regulatory acts of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of ensuring the security of personal data;
• Federal Law No. 63-FZ "About electronic signature " ;
• Order of the FSB of the Russian Federation No. 378 "On approval of the Composition and content of organizational and technical measures to ensure the security of personal data during their processing in personal data information systems using cryptographic information protection tools necessary to fulfill the requirements established by the Government of the Russian Federation for the protection of personal data for each of the security levels";
• FAPSI Order No. 152 " On approval of the Instruction on organizing and ensuring the security of storage, processing and transmission through communication channels using cryptographic protection of information with limited access that does not contain information constituting a state secret»;
• Order of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation N 66 " On approval of the Regulation on the development, production, sale and operation of encryption (cryptographic) means of information protection (Regulation PKZ-2005) »;

1.3. This Policy applies to crypto tools designed to ensure the security of confidential information and personal data during their processing in information systems;

1.4. Cryptographic tools information security ( Further - CIPF ) that implement encryption and electronic signature functions are used to protect electronic documents transmitted over public communication channels, for example, public network Internet, or dial-up communication channels.

1.5. To ensure security, it is necessary to use CIPF, which:

• allow embedding in technological processes for processing electronic messages, provide interaction with application software at the level of processing requests for cryptographic transformations and issuance of results;
• are supplied by the developers with a complete set of operational documentation, including a description of the key system, rules for working with it, as well as a rationale for the necessary organizational and staffing;
• support the continuity of the processes of logging the operation of the CIPF and ensuring integrity software for the CIPF functioning environment, which is a set of hardware and software tools, together with which the regular functioning of the CIPF takes place and which can affect the fulfillment of the requirements for the CIPF;
• certified by an authorized state body or have permission from the FSB of Russia.

1.6. CIPF used to protect personal data must have a class of at least KS2.

1.7. CIPF are implemented on the basis of algorithms that comply with the national standards of the Russian Federation, the terms of the contract with the counterparty.

1.8. CIPF, licenses, related key documents, instructions for CIPF are acquired by the organization independently or can be obtained from a third-party organization initiating a secure document flow.

1.9. CIPF, including installation media, key documents, descriptions and instructions for CIPF, constitute a trade secret in accordance with the Regulations on confidential information.

1. The procedure for using CIPF

2.1. Installation and configuration of cryptographic information protection tools is carried out in accordance with the operational documentation, instructions of the Federal Security Service of Russia, other organizations involved in secure electronic document management. Upon completion of installation and configuration, the readiness of the CIPF for use is checked, conclusions are drawn up on the possibility of their operation and the CIPF is put into operation.

Placement and installation of CIPF, as well as other equipment operating with crypto-means, in sensitive premises should minimize the possibility of uncontrolled access of unauthorized persons to these means. Maintenance such equipment and the change of crypto keys are carried out in the absence of persons not allowed to work with CIPF data. It is necessary to provide for organizational and technical measures that exclude the possibility of using CIPF by unauthorized persons. The physical location of the CIPF should ensure the security of the CIPF, preventing unauthorized access to the CIPF. Access of persons to the premises where protective equipment is located is limited in accordance with the need for service and is determined by a list approved by the director.

The embedding of crypto-means of class KS1 and KS2 is carried out without control by the FSB of Russia ( if this control is not provided for by the terms of reference for the development (modernization) of the information system).

The embedding of cryptographic tools of the KS3, KB1, KB2 and KA1 classes is carried out only under the control of the FSB of Russia.

The embedding of cryptographic tools of the KS1, KS2 or KS3 class can be carried out either by the user of the cryptographic tool if he has the appropriate license from the FSB of Russia, or by an organization that has the appropriate license from the FSB of Russia.

The embedding of a cryptographic tool of the KV1, KV2 or KA1 class is carried out by an organization that has the appropriate license from the FSB of Russia.

Decommissioning of CIPF is carried out subject to procedures that ensure the guaranteed deletion of information, the unauthorized use of which may damage the business activities of the organization, and information used by the security tools. information security, from permanent memory and from external media (with the exception of archives of electronic documents and protocols of electronic interaction, the maintenance and preservation of which for a certain period of time are provided for by the relevant regulatory and (or) contractual documents) and is drawn up by the Act. CIPF destroy ( dispose of) by decision of the owner of the cryptographic instrument, and with notification of the organization responsible in accordance with the organization of the copy accounting of cryptographic instruments.

scheduled for destruction recycling) CIPF are subject to withdrawal from the hardware with which they functioned. At the same time, cryptographic tools are considered withdrawn from the hardware if the procedure for removing the software of cryptographic tools provided for by the operational and technical documentation for the CIPF is completed and they are completely disconnected from the hardware.

Units and parts of general-purpose hardware suitable for further use, not specifically designed for hardware implementation of cryptographic algorithms or other cryptographic information protection functions, as well as equipment that works in conjunction with cryptographic tools ( monitors, printers, scanners, keyboards, etc.), it is allowed to use after the destruction of the CIPF without restrictions. At the same time, information that may remain in the memory devices of the equipment ( e.g. printers, scanners), must be securely removed ( erased).

2.2. The operation of CIPF is carried out by persons appointed by order of the director of the organization and trained to work with them. If there are two or more users of CIPF, the duties between them are distributed taking into account personal responsibility for the safety of crypto-means, key, operational and technical documentation, as well as for the assigned areas of work.

Users of cryptocurrencies are required to:

• not to disclose information to which they are admitted, including information about CIPF and other protection measures;
• not to disclose information about key documents;
• prevent copies from being made of key documents;
• prevent key documents from being displayed ( monitor) personal computer or printer;
• not allow recording of extraneous information on the key carrier;
• prevent key documents from being installed on other personal computers;
• comply with the requirements for ensuring the security of information, the requirements for ensuring the security of CIPF and key documents to them;
• report on attempts by unauthorized persons that have become known to them to obtain information about the cryptographic information protection tools used or key documents to them;
• immediately notify about the facts of loss or shortage of CIPF, key documents to them, keys to premises, vaults, personal seals and other facts that may lead to the disclosure of protected information;
• hand over the CIPF, operational and technical documentation for them, key documents upon dismissal or removal from the performance of duties related to the use of cryptographic tools.

The security of information processing using CIPF is ensured by:

• observance by users of confidentiality when handling information that they are entrusted with or become aware of at work, including information about the functioning and security procedures of the cryptographic information protection tools used and key documents for them;
• exact fulfillment by CIPF users of requirements for information security;
• reliable storage of operational and technical documentation for CIPF, key documents, media of limited distribution;
• timely detection of attempts by unauthorized persons to obtain information about protected information, about the used CIPF or key documents to them;
• taking immediate measures to prevent the disclosure of protected information, as well as its possible leakage when facts of loss or shortage of CIPF, key documents to them, certificates, passes, keys to premises, vaults, safes are revealed ( metal cabinets), personal seals, etc.

If necessary, transfer technical means service message links limited access concerning the organization and operation of the CIPF, these messages must be transmitted only using cryptographic means. The transfer of crypto keys via technical means of communication is not allowed, with the exception of specially organized systems with decentralized supply of crypto keys.

CIPF are subject to accounting using indices or conditional names and registration numbers. The list of indices, conditional names and registration numbers of cryptocurrencies is determined Federal Service security of the Russian Federation.

Used or stored CIPF, operational and technical documentation for them, key documents are subject to copy accounting. The form of the CIPF Logbook is given in Appendix No. 1, the Key Carriers Logbook in Appendix No. 2 to this Policy. At the same time, software CIPF should be taken into account together with the hardware with which their regular operation is carried out. If hardware or hardware-software cryptographic information protection means are connected to the system bus or to one of the internal hardware interfaces, then such crypto-means are also taken into account together with the corresponding hardware.

The unit of copy accounting of key documents is considered to be a reusable key carrier, a key notepad. If the same key medium is repeatedly used to record crypto keys, then it should be registered separately each time.

All received copies of crypto-means, operational and technical documentation for them, key documents must be issued against receipt in the corresponding copy-by-instance register to users of crypto-means who are personally responsible for their safety.

The transfer of cryptographic information protection tools, operational and technical documentation to them, key documents is allowed only between users of cryptographic tools and (or) the responsible user of cryptographic tools against receipt in the relevant logs of instance-by-instance accounting. Such transfer between users of cryptographic tools must be authorized.

Storage of CIPF installation media, operational and technical documentation, key documents is carried out in cabinets ( boxes, storage) individual use in conditions that exclude uncontrolled access to them, as well as their unintentional destruction.

The hardware with which the regular functioning of the CIPF is carried out, as well as the hardware and hardware-software CIPF must be equipped with means to control their opening ( sealed, sealed). Sealing place ( sealing) crypto-means, hardware should be such that it can be visually controlled. In the presence of technical feasibility during the absence of users of cryptographic tools, these funds must be disconnected from the communication line and put away in sealed vaults.

Making changes to the CIPF software and technical documentation for CIPF is carried out on the basis of received from the CIPF manufacturer and documented updates with fixation of checksums.

The operation of the CIPF involves maintaining at least two backup copies of the software and one backup key carriers. Recovery of CIPF performance in emergency situations is carried out in accordance with the operational documentation.

2.3. The production of key documents from the original key information is carried out by responsible users of the CIPF, using regular cryptographic tools, if such an opportunity is provided for by the operational and technical documentation in the presence of a license from the Federal Security Service of Russia for the production of key documents for cryptographic tools.

Key documents can be delivered by courier ( including departmental) communication or with specially designated responsible users of cryptographic tools and employees, subject to measures that exclude uncontrolled access to key documents during delivery.

To send key documents, they must be placed in strong packaging, which excludes the possibility of their physical damage and external influence. On the packages indicate the responsible user for whom these packages are intended. Such packages are marked "Personally". The packages are sealed in such a way that it is impossible to extract the contents from them without violating the packages and seal impressions.

Prior to the initial deportation ( or return) the addressee is informed by a separate letter of the description of the packages sent to him and the seals with which they can be sealed.

To send key documents, a cover letter is prepared, in which it is necessary to indicate: what is sent and in what quantity, account numbers of documents, and, if necessary, the purpose and procedure for using the sent item. A cover letter is enclosed in one of the packages.

The packages received are opened only by the responsible user of the cryptographic tools for which they are intended. If the contents of the received package do not correspond to those specified in the cover letter or the package itself and the seal - their description ( impression), and also if the packaging is damaged, resulting in free access to its contents, the recipient draws up an act that is sent to the sender. Key documents received with such shipments are not allowed to be used until instructions are received from the sender.

If defective key documents or crypto keys are found, one copy of the defective product should be returned to the manufacturer to determine the causes of the incident and eliminate them in the future, and the remaining copies should be stored until additional instructions from the manufacturer are received.

Receipt of key documents must be confirmed to the sender in accordance with the procedure indicated in the cover letter. The sender is obliged to control the delivery of his items to the addressees. If the appropriate confirmation has not been received from the addressee in a timely manner, the sender must send him a request and take measures to clarify the location of the items.

An order for the production of the next key documents, their production and distribution to the places of use for the timely replacement of existing key documents is made in advance. An indication of the entry into force of the next key documents is given by the responsible user of cryptographic tools only after receiving confirmation from them that the next key documents have been received.

Unused or out of action key documents are to be returned to the responsible user of cryptographic tools or, at his direction, must be destroyed on the spot.

Destruction of crypto keys ( initial key information) can be done by physically destroying the key medium on which they are located, or by erasing ( destruction) cryptokeys ( initial key information) without damaging the key carrier ( to enable it to be reused).

Crypto keys ( original key information) are erased according to the technology adopted for the corresponding key reusable media ( floppy disks, compact disks (CD-ROM), Data Key, Smart Card, Touch Memory, etc.). Direct actions to erase crypto keys ( initial key information), as well as possible restrictions on the further use of the relevant key reusable media are regulated by the operational and technical documentation for the relevant cryptographic information protection tools, as well as instructions from the organization that recorded the crypto keys ( initial key information).

Key carriers are destroyed by inflicting irreparable physical damage on them, excluding the possibility of their use, as well as restoring key information. Direct actions to destroy a specific type of key carrier are regulated by the operational and technical documentation for the relevant cryptographic information protection tools, as well as instructions from the organization that recorded the crypto keys ( initial key information).

Paper and other combustible key carriers are destroyed by burning or using any paper cutting machines.

Key documents are destroyed within the time limits specified in the operational and technical documentation for the relevant CIPF. The fact of destruction is documented in the relevant copy-by-instance registers.

Destruction according to the act is carried out by a commission consisting of at least two people. The act specifies what is destroyed and in what quantity. At the end of the act, a final entry is made (in numbers and in words) on the number of items and copies of the key documents to be destroyed, installing the CIPF media, operational and technical documentation. Corrections in the text of the act must be specified and certified by the signatures of all members of the commission who took part in the destruction. About the destruction carried out, marks are made in the corresponding journals of copy accounting.

Cryptokeys that are suspected of being compromised, as well as other cryptokeys operating in conjunction with them, must be immediately deactivated, unless otherwise specified in the operational and technical documentation of the CIPF. In emergency cases, when there are no crypto keys to replace the compromised ones, it is allowed, by decision of the responsible user of crypto tools, agreed with the operator, to use compromised crypto keys. In this case, the period of use of compromised crypto keys should be as short as possible, and the protected information should be as less valuable as possible.

On violations that may lead to the compromise of crypto keys, their components or transmitted ( stored) with their use of the data, users of cryptographic tools are required to report to the responsible user of cryptographic tools.

Inspection of key reusable media by unauthorized persons should not be considered as a suspicion of compromising cryptokeys, if this excludes the possibility of copying them ( reading, reproduction).

In cases of shortage, non-presentation of key documents, as well as the uncertainty of their location, the responsible user takes urgent measures to search for them and localize the consequences of compromising key documents.

1. Key system management procedure

Registration of persons with key management rights is carried out in accordance with the operational documentation for the CIPF.

Key management is an information process that includes three elements:

- key generation;

— accumulation of keys;

- distribution of keys.

In the information systems of the organization, special hardware and software methods for generating random keys are used. As a rule, pseudo random number generators are used ( Further - PSCH ), with a sufficiently high degree of randomness of their generation. Quite acceptable are software key generators that calculate the PRNG as complex function from the current time and ( or) number entered by the user.

Under the accumulation of keys is understood the organization of their storage, accounting and deletion.

Secret keys should not be written explicitly on a medium that can be read or copied.

All information about the keys used must be stored in encrypted form. Keys that encrypt key information are called master keys. Each user must know the master keys by heart, it is forbidden to store them on any material media.

For the condition of information security, it is necessary to periodically update key information in information systems. This reassigns both regular keys and master keys.

When distributing keys, the following requirements must be met:

- efficiency and accuracy of distribution;

— secrecy of distributed keys.

An alternative is for two users to obtain a shared key from a central authority, a key distribution center (KDC), through which they can securely interact. To organize data exchange between the CRC and the user, the latter is allocated a special key during registration, which encrypts messages transmitted between them. Each user is allocated a separate key.

KEY MANAGEMENT BASED ON PUBLIC KEY SYSTEMS

Before using a public key cryptosystem to exchange ordinary secret keys, users must exchange their public keys.

Public key management can be done through an online or offline directory service, and users can also exchange keys directly.

1. Monitoring and control of the use of CIPF

To increase the level of security during the operation of cryptographic information protection in the system, it is necessary to implement monitoring procedures that record all significant events that took place during the exchange electronic messages, and all information security incidents. The description and list of these procedures should be established in the operational documentation for the CIPF.

Control of the use of CIPF provides:

• control over the compliance of the settings and configuration of information security tools, as well as hardware and software tools that can affect the fulfillment of the requirements for information security tools, regulatory and technical documentation;
• monitoring compliance with the rules for storing restricted access information used in the operation of information security tools ( in particular, key, password and authentication information);
• control of the possibility of access by unauthorized persons to information security tools, as well as to hardware and software tools that can affect the fulfillment of the requirements for information security tools;
• monitoring compliance with incident response rules information information (about the facts of loss, compromise of key, password and authentication information, as well as any other information of limited access);
• control of compliance of technical and software means of CIPF and documentation for these means with reference samples ( supplier guarantees or control mechanisms that allow such compliance to be established independently);
• control of the integrity of the hardware and software of the CIPF and documentation for these tools during the storage and commissioning of these tools ( using both the control mechanisms described in the documentation for the CIPF, and using organizational).

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Anyone who seriously thinks about the security of their confidential information faces the task of selecting software for cryptographic data protection. And there is absolutely nothing surprising in this - encryption is by far one of the most reliable ways to prevent unauthorized access to important documents, databases, photos and any other files.

The problem is that for a competent choice it is necessary to understand all aspects of the operation of cryptographic products. Otherwise, you can very easily make a mistake and stop at software that either does not allow you to protect all the necessary information, or does not provide the proper degree of security. What should you pay attention to? First, these are the encryption algorithms available in the product. Secondly, the methods of authentication of information owners. Third, ways to protect information. Fourth, additional features and capabilities. Fifthly, the authority and fame of the manufacturer, as well as the availability of certificates for the development of encryption tools. And that's not all that may be important when choosing a cryptographic protection system.

It is clear that it is difficult for a person who is not versed in the field of information security to find answers to all these questions.

Secret Disk 4 Lite

Secret Disk 4 Lite is developed by Aladdin, one of the world leaders working in the field of information security. She has many certifications. And although the product in question is not a certified tool (Secret Disk 4 has a separate certified version), this fact indicates the recognition of the company as a serious developer of cryptographic tools.

Secret Disk 4 Lite can be used for encryption separate sections hard drive, any removable drives, as well as to create secure virtual drives. Thus, with this tool, you can solve most of the problems related to cryptography. Separately, it is worth noting the possibility of encryption system partition. In this case, the boot of the OS by an unauthorized user becomes impossible. Moreover, this protection is incommensurably more reliable than the built-in Windows protection tools.

Secret Disk 4 Lite does not have built-in encryption algorithms. This program uses external cryptographic providers for its work. By default, a standard module integrated into Windows is used. It implements the DES and 3DES algorithms. However, today they are considered obsolete. Therefore, for better protection You can download a special Secret Disk Crypto Pack from the Aladdin website. This is a cryptographic provider that implements the most secure cryptographic technologies to date, including AES and Twofish with a key length of up to 256 bits. By the way, if necessary, in combination with Secret Disk 4 Lite, you can use certified algorithm providers Signal-COM CSP and CryptoPro CSP.

A distinctive feature of Secret Disk 4 Lite is the user authentication system. The point is that it is built on the use digital certificates. To do this, a hardware USB eToken is included in the product package. It is a highly secure storage for secret keys. In fact, we are talking about full-fledged two-factor authentication (the presence of a token plus knowledge of its PIN code). As a result, the encryption system under consideration is spared such a "bottleneck" as the use of conventional password protection.

Of the additional functions of Secret Disk 4 Lite, one can note the possibility of multi-user work (the owner of encrypted disks can provide access to them to other people) and the background operation of the encryption process.

The interface of Secret Disk 4 Lite is simple and straightforward. It is made in Russian, just like the detailed help system, which describes all the nuances of using the product.

InfoWatch CryptoStorage

InfoWatch CryptoStorage is a product of a fairly well-known company InfoWatch, which has certificates for the development, distribution and maintenance of encryption tools. As already noted, they are not mandatory, but they can play the role of a kind of indicator of the seriousness of the company and the quality of its products.

Figure 1. Context menu

InfoWatch CryptoStorage implements only one encryption algorithm - AES with a key length of 128 bits. User authentication is implemented using conventional password protection. For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that the program has a minimum length limit keywords, equal to six characters. However, password protection is certainly far inferior in its reliability to two-factor authentication using tokens. A feature of the InfoWatch CryptoStorage program is its versatility. The point is that it can be used to encrypt individual files and folders, entire partitions of the hard drive, any removable drives, as well as virtual drives.

This product, like the previous one, allows you to protect system drives, that is, it can be used to prevent unauthorized booting of the computer. In fact, InfoWatch CryptoStorage allows you to solve the whole range of tasks related to the use of symmetric encryption.

An additional feature of the product under consideration is the organization of multi-user access to encrypted information. In addition, InfoWatch CryptoStorage implements guaranteed data destruction without the possibility of their recovery.

InfoWatch CryptoStorage is a Russian-language program. Its interface is made in Russian, but it is rather unusual: the main window as such is missing (there is only a small configurator window), and almost all the work is done using context menu. Such a solution is unusual, but one cannot but recognize its simplicity and convenience. Naturally, the Russian-language documentation in the program is also available.

Rohos Disk is a product of Tesline-Service.S.R.L. It is part of a line of small utilities that implement various tools for protecting confidential information. This series has been under development since 2003.

Figure 2. Program interface

Rohos Disk is designed for cryptographic protection of computer data. It allows you to create encrypted virtual drives on which you can save any files and folders, as well as install software.

To protect data, this product uses the AES cryptographic algorithm with a key length of 256 bits, which provides a high degree security.

Rohos Disk has two methods for user authentication. The first of them is the usual password protection with all its shortcomings. The second option is to use a regular USB disk, on which the necessary key is written.

This option is also not very reliable. When using it, the loss of a "flash drive" can lead to serious problems.

Rohos Disk has a wide range of additional features. First of all, it is worth noting the protection of USB drives. Its essence is to create a special encrypted partition on the "flash drive" in which you can safely transfer confidential data.

Moreover, the product includes a separate utility with which you can open and view these USB drives on computers that do not have Rohos Disk installed.

The next additional feature is steganography support. The essence of this technology is to hide encrypted information inside multimedia files (AVI, MP3, MPG, WMV, WMA, OGG formats are supported).

Its use allows you to hide the very fact of the presence of a secret disk by placing it, for example, inside the movie. The last additional function is the destruction of information without the possibility of its recovery.

The Rohos Disk program has a traditional Russian-language interface. In addition, she is accompanied help system, perhaps not as detailed as the two previous products, but sufficient to master the principles of its use.

Speaking of cryptographic utilities, one cannot fail to mention free software. Indeed, today in almost all areas there are worthy products that are distributed completely freely. And information security is no exception to this rule.

True, there is a twofold attitude to the use of free software for information protection. The fact is that many utilities are written by single programmers or small groups. At the same time, no one can vouch for the quality of their implementation and the absence of "holes", accidental or intentional. But cryptographic solutions themselves are quite difficult to develop. When creating them, you need to take into account a huge number of different nuances. That is why it is recommended to use only well-known products, and always with open source. This is the only way to be sure that they are free from "bookmarks" and tested by a large number of specialists, which means that they are more or less reliable. An example of such a product is the TrueCrypt program.

Figure 3. Program interface

TrueCrypt is arguably one of the most feature-rich free cryptographic utilities out there. Initially, it was used only to create secure virtual disks. Still, for most users, this is the most convenient way to protect various information. However, over time, the function of encrypting the system partition appeared in it. As we already know, it is intended to protect the computer from unauthorized startup. However, TrueCrypt does not yet know how to encrypt all other partitions, as well as individual files and folders.

The product in question implements several encryption algorithms: AES, Serpent, and Twofish. The owner of the information can choose which one he wants to use in this moment. User authentication in TrueCrypt can be done using ordinary passwords. However, there is another option - using key files that can be stored on a hard drive or any removable storage. Separately, it is worth noting that this program supports tokens and smart cards, which allows you to organize reliable two-factor authentication.

From additional features of the program under consideration, it is possible to note the possibility of creating hidden volumes inside the main ones. It is used to hide sensitive data when a drive is opened under duress. Also, TrueCrypt implements a system Reserve copy volume headers for crash recovery or reverting to old passwords.

The TrueCrypt interface is familiar to utilities of this kind. It is multilingual, and it is possible to install the Russian language. Documentation is much worse. It is, and very detailed, but written in English language. Naturally, about any technical support there can be no speech.

For greater clarity, all their features and functionality are summarized in table 2.

Table 2 - Functionality cryptographic information protection programs.

Secret Disk 4 lite	InfoWatch CryptoStorage
Encryption algorithms	DES, 3DES, AES, TwoFish			AES, Serpent, TwoFish
Maximum encryption key length
Connecting external crypto providers
Strong authentication using tokens				+ (tokens are purchased separately)
Encryption of files and folders
Partition encryption
System Encryption
Encryption of virtual disks
Removable storage encryption
Support for multi-user work
Guaranteed data destruction
Hiding encrypted objects
Work under duress
Russian-language interface
Russian language documentation
Technical support

Listen ... can you, for our common benefit, every letter that arrives at your post office, incoming and outgoing, you know, sort of print it out a little and read: does it contain any report or just correspondence .. .

N.V. Gogol "Inspector"

Ideally, only two people should be able to read a confidential letter: the sender and the one to whom it is addressed. The formulation of such a seemingly very simple thing was the starting point of cryptoprotection systems. The development of mathematics gave impetus to the development of such systems.

Already in the XVII-XVIII centuries, ciphers in Russia were quite sophisticated and resistant to breaking. Many Russian mathematicians worked on the creation or improvement of encryption systems and at the same time tried to pick up the keys to the ciphers of other systems. Currently, several Russian encryption systems can be noted, such as Lexicon Verba, Secret Net, DALLAS LOCK, Secret Disk, the Accord product family, etc. We will talk about them. You will also get acquainted with the main software and hardware and software cryptoprotection complexes, learn about their capabilities, strengths and weaknesses. We hope that this article will help you make a choice of a cryptographic protection system.

Introduction

Are you concerned that important information from your computer can fall into the wrong hands? This information can be used by competitors, regulatory authorities, and simply ill-wishers. Obviously, such actions can bring you significant damage. What to do? In order to protect your information from strangers, you must install one of the data encryption programs. Our review is devoted to the analysis of encryption systems for desktop systems. It should be noted that the use of foreign encryption systems in Russia is very limited for a number of reasons, therefore state organizations and large domestic companies are forced to use Russian developments. However, medium and small companies, as well as individuals, sometimes prefer foreign systems.

For the uninitiated, encryption of information looks like something of a black magic. Indeed, encrypting messages to hide their content from outsiders is a complex mathematical problem. In addition, the cipher must be chosen in such a way that it would be practically impossible to open it without a key, and quickly and easily with a key. Many companies and organizations find it very difficult to optimal choice when installing encryption programs. The matter is further complicated by the fact that absolutely secure computers and absolutely reliable encryption systems do not exist. However, there are still enough ways by which you can repel almost all attempts to reveal encrypted information.

What do encryption programs have inside

Encryption programs differ from each other in the encryption algorithm. Once the file is encrypted, you can write it to a floppy disk, send it via e-mail or put on a server on your local network. The recipient of your encryption must have the same encryption program in order to read the contents of the file.

If you want to send an encrypted message to multiple users at the same time, then your information for each recipient can be encrypted with their own key or with a shared key for all users (including the author of the message).

The cryptosystem uses a secret code to turn your information into a meaningless, pseudo-random set of characters. At good algorithm encryption, it is almost impossible to decrypt a message without knowing secret code used for encryption. Such algorithms are called symmetric key algorithms because the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt information.

To protect your data, the encryption program creates a secret key based on your password. You just need to set a long password that no one can guess. However, if you want someone else to read the file, you'll need to tell that person the secret key (or the password it's based on). You can be sure that even a simple encryption algorithm will protect your data from regular user, say, from a colleague at work. However, professionals have a number of ways to decrypt a message without knowing the secret code.

Without special knowledge, you will not be able to independently check how reliable your encryption algorithm is. But you can rely on the opinion of professionals. Some encryption algorithms, such as Triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) have been subjected to years of testing. According to the results of the test, this algorithm has proven itself well, and cryptographers believe that it can be trusted. Most of the new algorithms are also carefully studied, and the results are published in the specialized literature.

If the algorithm of the program has not been openly reviewed and discussed by professionals, if it does not have certificates and other official papers, this is a reason to doubt its reliability and refuse to use such a program.

Another type of encryption systems are public key systems. For such a system to work, there is no need to tell the addressee the secret key (or the password on the basis of which it was created). These encryption systems generate two digital keys for each user: one is used to encrypt data, the other - to decrypt them. The first key (called the public key) can be made public, while the second key is kept secret. After that, anyone can encrypt the information using the public key, and only those who have the corresponding secret key can decrypt it.

Some encryption programs contain another important means of protection - a digital signature. A digital signature certifies that the file has not been modified since it was signed and gives the recipient information about who exactly signed the file. Creation algorithm digital signature based on the calculation of the checksum - the so-called hash sum, or message digest. The applied algorithms guarantee that it is impossible to pick up two different files whose hash sums would match.

When the recipient receives a digitally signed file, their encryption program recalculates the hash sum for that file. The recipient then uses the public key published by the sender to recover the digital signature. If the result matches the value calculated for the file, then the recipient can be sure that the text of the message has not been changed (if this happened, the hash sum would be different), and the signature belongs to a person who has access to the sender's secret key.

Protecting sensitive or confidential information requires more than just good program encryption. You need to take a number of measures to ensure information security. If your password is weak (experts recommend setting it to eight or more characters) or if an unencrypted copy of confidential information is stored on your computer, then in this case even best system encryption will be powerless.

Lexicon-Verba system

The Lexicon-Verba system is a means of organizing a protected electronic document management both within the corporate network and between different organizations. Lexicon-Verba uses two modifications of the cryptography system: the Verba-W system is intended for state bodies (protection of confidential information, in particular chipboard; signature keys are open, encryption keys are closed), the Verba-OW system is for commercial organizations (protection of trade secrets; signature and encryption keys are open).

There are quite a few global encryption standards, but only a small part of them are certified by the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI), which makes it impossible to use non-certified solutions in Russia. The Verba-W system has a FAPSI certificate No. SF / 114-0176. Verba-OW system - FAPSI certificate No. SF / 114-0174.

"Lexicon-Verba" provides encryption and digital signature in accordance with the requirements of GOST 28147-89 "Information processing systems. Cryptographic protection" and GOST R34.10-94 " Information technology. Cryptographic protection of information. Procedures for the development and verification of an electronic digital signature based on an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm.

The program is certified by the State Technical Commission under the President of the Russian Federation. In July, it is expected to receive a certificate from the Russian Ministry of Defense.

The cryptographic protection of the system is based on the method of encryption with a public key. Each key that identifies a user consists of two parts: a public key and a private key. The public key is freely distributed and is used to encrypt information this user. To decrypt a document, the person who encrypted it must have your public key and identify you as having access to the document when encrypting it.

To decrypt a document, you need to use the private key. The private key consists of two parts, one of which is stored on a smart card or touch-memory, and the other is stored on your computer's hard drive. Thus, neither the loss of a smart card nor unauthorized access to a computer makes it possible, individually, to decrypt documents.

Initial key set including full information about the public and private keys of the user, is created at a specially equipped secure workplace. A floppy disk with key information is used only at the stage of preparing the user's workplace.

The Lexicon-Verba system can be used within the framework of two main systems for organizing secure document management:

• as a standalone solution. If the organization has a local network, the system can be installed not on all computers, but only on those that require working with confidential documents. This means that inside the corporate network there is a subnet for the exchange of classified information. At the same time, participants in the closed part of the system can exchange open documents with other employees;
• as part of the workflow. Lexicon-Verba has standard connection interfaces external functions to perform the operations of opening, saving, closing and sending documents, which makes it easy to integrate this system into both existing and newly developed workflow systems.

It should be noted that the properties of the Lexicon-Verba system make it not only a means of providing information protection from external intrusions, but also as a means of increasing intra-corporate confidentiality and sharing access.

One of the important additional resources for increasing the level of information security control is the ability to maintain an "event log" for any document. The document history fixing feature can only be enabled or disabled when the system is installed; when it is turned on this magazine will be conducted regardless of the desire of the user.

The main advantage and distinctive feature system is a simple and intuitive implementation of information security functions while maintaining the traditional word processors user's working environment.

The cryptography unit performs encryption, as well as the installation and removal of an electronic digital signature (EDS) of documents.

Auxiliary functions of the block - downloading a secret key, exporting and importing public keys, setting up and maintaining a directory of system subscriber keys.

Thus, each of those who have access to the document can put only his signature, but remove any of the previously set ones.

This reflects the accepted procedure of office work, when, as the document is approved, it can be subject to revisions at different stages, but after that the document must be approved again.

If you try to make changes to the document by means other than "Lexicon-Verba", the EDS is damaged, as a result, the inscription "Damaged" will appear in the "Signature Status" field.

Office

As the number of system users increases, entering each public key on each computer becomes difficult. Therefore, to organize the work of the office, centralized administration of the public key directory is organized. This is done in the following way:

1) "Lexicon-Verba" is installed on the administrator's computer in local mode. This creates a directory of public keys, in which the administrator adds each key used in the office;

2) on all other computers, the system is installed in network mode. This mode uses the public key directory located on the administrator's computer;

3) each New user, added by the administrator to the directory, becomes "visible" to all users connected to the directory. From that moment on, they get the opportunity to transfer encrypted documents to him.

Directory administration becomes centralized, but this does not affect the level of system security, since providing access to public keys is a kind of "acquaintance" of users, but it does not give access to any documents. For a user to be able to decrypt a document, their public key must not only be in the directory, but must also be explicitly listed as having access to the document.

TO means of cryptographic information protection(CIPF), include hardware, firmware and software that implement cryptographic algorithms information transformation.

It is assumed that cryptographic information protection tools are used in some computer system (in a number of sources - an information and telecommunication system or a communication network), together with mechanisms for implementing and guaranteeing a certain security policy.

Along with the term "means of cryptographic information protection", the term is often used scrambler- a device or program that implements an encryption algorithm. The introduced concept of CIPF includes an encoder, but in general it is broader.

The first operating systems (OS) for personal computers (MS-DOS and Windows versions up to 3.1 inclusive) did not have their own means of protection at all, which gave rise to the problem of creating additional means of protection. The urgency of this problem has practically not decreased with the advent of more powerful operating systems with advanced protection subsystems. This is due to the fact that most systems are not able to protect data that is outside of it, for example, when using network information exchange.

Cryptographic information protection tools that provide an increased level of protection can be divided into five main groups (Fig. 2.1).

Rice. 2.1 Main groups of CIPF

The first group is formed identification systems And user authentication. Such systems are used to limit the access of casual and illegal users to the resources of a computer system. General algorithm The operation of these systems is to obtain from the user information proving his identity, verify its authenticity and then provide (or not provide) this user with the ability to work with the system.

The second group of tools that provide an increased level of protection are disk encryption systems. The main task solved by such systems is to protect against unauthorized use of data located on disk media.

Ensuring the confidentiality of data located on disk media is usually carried out by encrypting them using symmetric encryption algorithms. The main classification feature for encryption complexes is the level of their integration into a computer system.

Data encryption systems can perform cryptographic data transformations:

9. at the file level (individual files are protected);

10. at the disk level (entire disks are protected).

The programs of the first type include archivers such as WinRAR, which allow you to use cryptographic methods to protect archive files. An example of the second type of system is the Diskreet encryption program, which is part of the popular Norton Utilities software package.

Another classification feature of disk data encryption systems is the way they operate.

According to the method of functioning, the disk data encryption system is divided into two classes:

4) "transparent" encryption systems;

5) systems specially called for the implementation of encryption.

In systems transparent encryption(on-the-fly encryption) cryptographic transformations are carried out in real time, imperceptibly to the user. A striking example is the encryption of the Temp folder and My Documents when using EFS Win2000 - during operation, not only the documents themselves are encrypted, but also the created temporary files, and the user does not notice this process.

Second-class systems are usually utilities that need to be specifically invoked to perform encryption. These include, for example, archivers with built-in password protection.

The third group of tools that provide an increased level of protection include encryption systems for data transmitted over computer networks. There are two main encryption methods:

channel encryption;

terminal (subscriber) encryption.

When channel encryption all information transmitted over the communication channel, including service information, is protected. The corresponding encryption procedures are implemented using the link layer protocol of the seven-layer reference model of interaction open systems OSI (Open System Interconnect).

This encryption method has the following advantage - embedding encryption procedures at the link layer allows the use of hardware, which improves system performance.

However, this approach has significant drawbacks, in particular, the encryption of service information, which is inevitable on given level, can lead to the appearance of statistical patterns in encrypted data; this affects the reliability of protection and imposes restrictions on the use of cryptographic algorithms.

End-to-end (subscriber) encryption allows you to ensure the confidentiality of data transmitted between two application objects (subscribers). End-to-end encryption is implemented using an application or presentation layer protocol of the OSI reference model. In this case, only the content of the message is protected, all service information remains open. This method allows you to avoid problems associated with encryption of service information, but other problems arise. In particular, an attacker who has access to communication channels computer network, gets the ability to analyze information about the structure of the message exchange, for example, about the sender and recipient, about the time and conditions of data transmission, as well as about the amount of data transmitted.

The fourth group of defenses are electronic data authentication systems.

When exchanging electronic data over communication networks, the problem arises of authenticating the author of the document and the document itself, i.e. establishing the author's identity and checking the absence of changes in the received document.

To authenticate electronic data, a message authentication code (imitation insertion) or an electronic digital signature is used. When generating a message authentication code and an electronic digital signature, the different types encryption systems.

The fifth group of means providing an increased level of protection is formed by key information management tools. Key information is understood as the totality of all information used in a computer system or network cryptographic keys.

As you know, the security of any cryptographic algorithm is determined by the cryptographic keys used. In the case of weak key management, an attacker can get hold of key information and get full access to all information on a computer system or network.

The main classification feature of key information management tools is the type of key management function. There are the following main types of key management functions: key generation, key storage and key distribution.

Ways key generation differ for symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems. To generate keys of symmetric cryptosystems, hardware and software tools for generating random numbers are used. Key generation for asymmetric cryptosystems is a much more difficult task due to the need to obtain keys with certain mathematical properties.

Function key storage involves the organization safe storage, accounting and deleting keys. To ensure the safe storage and transmission of keys, they are encrypted using other keys. This approach leads to key hierarchy concepts. The key hierarchy typically includes a master key (master key), a key encryption key, and a data encryption key. It should be noted that the generation and storage of master keys are critical issues in cryptographic protection.

Key distribution is the most responsible process in key management. This process should guarantee the secrecy of the distributed keys, as well as the speed and accuracy of their distribution. There are two main ways of distributing keys between users of a computer network:

the use of one or more key distribution centers;

direct exchange of session keys between users.

Let's move on to formulating the requirements for cryptographic information protection, common to all the classes considered.

Cryptographic methods of information protection can be implemented both in software and in hardware. A hardware encoder or cryptographic data protection device (UKZD) is, most often, an expansion board inserted into connector 18A or PC1 of a personal computer (PC) motherboard (Fig. 3.21). There are other implementation options, for example, in the form of an u8B key with cryptographic functions (Fig. 3.22).

Manufacturers of hardware encoders usually equip them with various additional features, including:

Generation of random numbers needed to obtain cryptographic keys. In addition, many cryptographic algorithms use them for other purposes, for example, in the electronic digital signature algorithm, GOST R 34.10-2001, a new random number is required for each signature calculation;

Rice. 3.21. Hardware encoder in the form of a PC1 board:

1 - technological connectors; 2 - memory for logging; 3 - mode switches; 4 - multifunctional memory; 5 - control unit and microprocessor; 6- PC1 interface; 7- PC1 controller; 8- DSC; 9- interfaces for connecting key carriers

Rice. 3.22.

• computer login control. When turning on the PC, the device requires the user to enter personal information (for example, insert a device with a private key). Loading operating system will be allowed only after the device recognizes the presented keys and considers them "its own". Otherwise, you will have to open system unit and remove the encoder from there to load the operating system (however, the information on the PC hard drive can also be encrypted);
• integrity control of operating system files to prevent malicious modification configuration files And system programs. The encoder stores a list of all important files with pre-calculated control hash values ​​for each of them, and if the hash value of at least one of the controlled files does not match the standard at the next OS boot, the computer will be blocked.

An encryptor that performs login control on a PC and checks the integrity of the operating system is also called " electronic lock» (see par. 1.3).

On fig. 3.23 shows a typical structure of a hardware encoder. Consider the functions of its main blocks:

• control unit - the main module of the encoder. It is usually implemented on the basis of a microcontroller, when choosing which the main thing is speed and a sufficient amount of internal resources, as well as external ports to connect all the necessary modules;
• PC system bus controller (for example, PC1), through which the main data exchange between UKZD and a computer is carried out;
• non-volatile storage device (memory), usually implemented on the basis of flash memory chips. It must be sufficiently capacious (several megabytes) and allow a large number of write cycles. This is where the microcontroller software is located, which you

Rice. 3.23. The UKZD structure is filled out when the device is initialized (when the encoder takes control when the computer boots);

• audit log memory, which is also a non-volatile memory (to avoid possible collisions, program memory and log memory should not be combined);
• cipher processor (or several similar units) - a specialized microcircuit or microcircuit of programmable logic PLD (Programmable Logic Device), which ensures the performance of cryptographic operations (encryption and decryption, calculation and verification of EDS, hashing);
• random number generator, which is a device that produces a statistically random and unpredictable signal (the so-called white noise). It can be, for example, a noise diode. Before further use in the cipher processor, according to special rules, white noise is converted into digital form;
• block for entering key information. Provides secure receipt of private keys from the key carrier and input of identification information about the user required for his authentication;
• block of switches required to disable the ability to work with external devices (drives, CD-ROM, parallel and serial ports, USB bus, etc.). If the user works with highly sensitive information, UKZD will block all external devices, including even a network card.

Cryptographic operations in UKZD should be performed in such a way as to exclude unauthorized access to session and private keys and the possibility of influencing the results of their implementation. Therefore, the cipher processor logically consists of several blocks (Fig. 3.24):

• calculator - a set of registers, adders, substitution blocks, etc. interconnected by data buses. Designed for the fastest execution of cryptographic operations. As input, the calculator receives open data that should be encrypted (decrypted) or signed, and a cryptographic key;
• control unit - a hardware-implemented program that controls the calculator. If for any reason

Rice. 3.24.

the program will change, its work will begin to falter. That's why this program should not only be securely stored and function stably, but also regularly check its integrity. The external control unit described above also periodically sends control tasks to the control unit. In practice, for greater confidence in the encoder, two cipher processors are installed that constantly compare the results of their cryptographic operations (if they do not match, the operation is repeated);

The I/O buffer is needed to improve the performance of the device: while the first block of data is being encrypted, the next one is being loaded, and so on. The same thing happens on the output. Such data pipeline transmission seriously increases the speed of cryptographic operations in the encoder.

There is one more task of ensuring security when performing cryptographic operations by the encryptor: loading keys into the encryptor, bypassing RAM computer, where they can theoretically be intercepted and even replaced. To do this, UKZD additionally contains input-output ports (for example, COM or USB), to which various key media readers are directly connected. These can be any smart cards, tokens (special USB keys) or Touch Memory elements (see par. 1.3). In addition to the direct entry of keys into UKZD, many of these media also provide their reliable storage - even a key carrier without knowing a special access code (for example, a PIN code) will not be able to read its contents.

In order to avoid collisions when simultaneously accessing the encoder different programs, special software is installed in the computer system

Rice. 3.25.

• (software) to control the encoder (Fig. 3.25). Such software issues commands through the encoder driver and transmits data to the encoder, making sure that information flows from different sources do not overlap, and also that the encoder always contains the right keys. Thus, UKZD performs two fundamentally different types commands:
• before loading the operating system, commands are executed that are in the memory of the encoder, which perform all the necessary checks (for example, user identification and authentication) and set the required security level (for example, turn off external devices);
• after loading the OS (for example, Windows), commands are executed that come through the encryptor control software (encrypt data, reload keys, calculate random numbers, etc.).

Such separation is necessary for security reasons - after executing the commands of the first block, which cannot be bypassed, the intruder will no longer be able to perform unauthorized actions.

Another purpose of the encoder management software is to provide the ability to replace one encoder with another (say, one that is more productive or implements other cryptographic algorithms) without changing the software. This happens in the same way, for example, changing network card: The encryptor comes with a driver that allows programs to perform a standard set of cryptographic functions in accordance with some application programming interface (for example, CryptAP1).

In the same way, you can replace a hardware encoder with a software one (for example, an encoder emulator). To do this, a software encoder is usually implemented as a driver that provides the same set of functions.

However, not all UKZD need the encoder management software (in particular, an encoder for "transparent" encryption-decryption of all hard drive The PC only needs to be set up once).

To additionally ensure the security of performing cryptographic operations in UKZD, multi-level protection of cryptographic keys of symmetric encryption can be used, in which a random session key is encrypted with a long-term user key, and that, in turn, with a master key (Fig. 3.26).

At the stage of initial loading, the master key is entered into the key cell No. 3 of the encoder memory. But for three-level encryption, you need to get two more. The session key is generated as a result of a request to the generator (sensor)

Rice. 3.26. Encryption of the file using UKZD ny numbers (DSN) encoder to obtain a random number, which is loaded into key cell No. 1 corresponding to the session key. It encrypts the contents of the file and creates new file A that stores the encrypted information.

Next, the user is prompted for a long-term key, which is loaded into key cell #2 with decryption using the master key located in cell #3. in this case, the key never “leaves” the encoder at all. Finally, the session key is encrypted using the long-term key in cell 2, downloaded from the encryptor, and written to the header of the encrypted file.

When decrypting a file, the session key is first decrypted using the user's long-term key, and then information is restored using it.

In principle, one key can be used for encryption, but a multi-key scheme has serious advantages. First, the possibility of an attack on a long-term key is reduced, since it is only used to encrypt short session keys. And this complicates the attacker cryptanalysis of encrypted information in order to obtain a long-term key. Secondly, when changing the long-term key, you can very quickly re-encrypt the file: it is enough to re-encrypt the session key from the old long-term key to the new one. Thirdly, the key carrier is unloaded, since only the master key is stored on it, and all long-term keys (and the user may have several of them for different purposes) can be stored encrypted with the master key even on the PC hard drive.

Encryptors in the form of SHV keys (see Fig. 3.22) cannot yet become a full-fledged replacement for a hardware encoder for the PC1 bus due to the low encryption speed. However, they have several interesting features. Firstly, a token (SW key) is not only a hardware encoder, but also a carrier of encryption keys, i.e. a two-in-one device. Secondly, tokens usually comply with common international cryptographic standards (RKSB #11, 1BO 7816, RS / 8C, etc.), and they can be used without additional settings in existing software tools information protection (for example, they can be used to authenticate users in the operating system of the family Microsoft Windows). And finally, the price of such an encoder is ten times lower than that of a classic hardware encoder for the PCI bus.